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Abstract
Using banks in the syndicated lending market, we discuss a firm-specific strategy that
has been overlooked by the literature, namely, that self-regulated firms pressure other
non-self-regulated firms in an attempt to reduce effort asymmetries when collaborating.
We develop a framework that shows when such a strategy is likely to be present. This
framework is built on the view that the costs and benefits of collaboration are equally
shared among self-regulated firms that collaborate. However, when self-regulated firms
collaborate with non-self-regulated firms, the effort they exert differs and is not equally
shared. In particular, we find that when firms collaborate, self-regulated firms pressure
non-self-regulated firms to become self-regulated with the purpose of reducing effort asym-
metries, and such a pressure increases with the duration of the collaboration.
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Introduction
A firm’s reaction to customer pressure and threats for stricter regulation is often to self-
regulate (Segerson and Miceli, 1998; Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett, 2000; Grajzl and Murrell,
2007; Pistor and Xu, 2003; Lenox and Nash, 2003). While firms are typically assumed to
interact with customers and governmental agents when opting for self-regulation, firms also
interact with other firms in the industry they belong to and such interactions may also
influence self-regulation choices by firms. The existing literature overlooks these inter-firm
interactions when studying self-regulation and our study fills this gap. In particular, we
investigate the adoption of self-regulation by firms interacting through collaboration with
the aim to advance our understanding of how inter-firm collaborations affect the degree
and speed at which firms self-regulate.
We use the global syndicated lending market to discuss a firm-specific strategy over-
looked by the literature, namely, that self-regulated firms pressure non-self-regulated firms
in an attempt to reduce effort asymmetries when collaborating. We develop a framework
to show when such a strategy is likely to be present. This framework is built on the view
that the costs and benefits of collaboration are equally shared among self-regulated firms
that collaborate. However, when self-regulated firms collaborate with non-self-regulated
firms, the effort they exert is likely to differ. In particular, we find that when firms collab-
orate, self-regulated firms pressure non-self-regulated firms to become self-regulated with
the purpose of reducing effort asymmetries, and such pressure increases with the length of
their collaboration.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theory and hypothesis.
Section 3 presents the empirical framework, and section 4 presents the data used. Section
5 contains the results, followed by robustness tests in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Theory and hypothesis
Self-regulation by firms is a fast growing and important complement to existing regulation
and policies (Kolk and van Tulder, 2002; Grajzl and Murrell, 2007). Following the ramping
up of market internationalization and globalization in the 1980s, international production
and investment became more complex creating a momentum for new regulatory initiatives
(Kolk and van Tulder, 2002). Since then, firms operating transnationally have been often
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challenged by governments and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to develop and
adopt new forms of regulation to address their transnational practices. Consequently,
by the early 2000s, a total of two thousand forms of self-regulation pertaining to issues
ranging from maritime transport, taxation, lending, to human rights existed (Kolk and
van Tulder, 2002).
Self-regulation is often a firm’s strategic response to restrict its own conduct to avoid
stiffer regulation by the government (Segerson and Miceli, 1998; Maxwell, Lyon, and Hack-
ett, 2000; Grajzl and Murrell, 2007; Pistor and Xu, 2003; Lenox and Nash, 2003). As such,
self-regulation has been studied as the interplay among three set of actors: consumers,
firms and government (Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett, 2000; Nunez, 2001; DeMarzo, Fish-
man, and Hagerty, 2005; Grajzl and Murrell, 2007). According to this setting, consumers
purchasing products from firms pressure the government, some times through NGOs or
other organizations, to implement a stricter regulation onto firms because a stricter regu-
lation is expected to decrease any information asymmetries about the product and services
firms supply (Grajzl and Murrell, 2007). In this way, consumers are able to discriminate
the firms providing high-quality products and services from those that do not. As a result,
governments respond to consumers’ pressure by threatening firms with imposing mandat-
ory regulation. Consequently, firms trade in the mandatory regulation for self-regulation
(Grajzl and Murrell, 2007; Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett, 2000). Such an interplay among
customers, government and firms is illustrated in the right-hand side triangle in Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Self-regulation can strategically prevent governmental regulation often resulting in self-
regulated firms experiencing a higher demand because the uncertainty about product and
service quality decreases. Self-regulation tends to soften competition among participat-
ing firms, and typically improves a firm’s reputation (Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett, 2000;
Short and Toffel, 2010; King, Lenox, and Terlaak, 2005; Potoski and Prakash, 2005; Ben-
abou and Tirole, 2006; Arora and Cason, 1995). Firms may also choose to self-regulate
in order to differentiate their products, reduce risk, reduce insurance premiums, circum-
vent government failure, improve their customer relationships, implement and/or increase
standards along the supply chain, and/or avoid boycotts and formal accusations (Lenox
and Nash, 2003; Diller, 1999; van Tulder and Kolk, 2001). Furthermore, the legal envir-
onment surrounding firms may also influence their choice for self-regulation. For example,
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Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett (2000), Grajzl and Murrell (2007) and LaPorta, de Silanes,
Schleifer, and Vishny (1997) find that self-regulation is also contingent on firms being loc-
ated in a country with a civil law system. Granted, not every firm and industry opt for
self-regulation. Possible reasons for not self-regulating include opportunity costs and lack
of improved financial performance (Lenox and Nash, 2003; Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett,
2000).
But what role does firm collaboration and interaction play in self-regulation? As gov-
ernments respond to consumer pressure and urge firms to self-regulate, firms’ best response
may very well be a collective action (Lenox and Nash, 2003), e.g., firms jointly becoming
self-regulated with the purpose of restricting their own conduct in order to avoid a man-
datory regulation from the government. An important condition for collective action to
occur is for firms to have some form of interaction, which may occur through collaboration
among firms, as illustrated in the left-hand side section of Figure 1. To understand how
firm interactions facilitate or hinder collective action, we need to understand who bears the
costs and benefits of self-regulation. With perfect collective action, e.g., a situation where
all firms in an industry become self-regulated, all firms bear the regulatory effort cost and
reap the benefits. In contrast, when only some firms in the industry self-regulate, self-
regulation can lead to an effort asymmetry between self- and non-self-regulated firms. To
see why this is the case, let us start from the premise that the self-regulated firm is commit-
ted to being self-regulated and to deliver the high-quality product the consumer expects.
Therefore, the self-regulated firm faces a choice between two possible actions. On the one
hand, the self-regulated firm may choose to collaborate with the non-self-regulated firm as
it results in the latter ripping collaboration benefits without exerting the effort the self-
regulated firm is required to exert in order to produce the high-quality product consumers
expect. On the other hand, because of the difference in effort exerted, the self-regulated
firm may opt to pressure the non-self-regulated firm into becoming self-regulated as well.
By peer pressuring the firm with whom it collaborates, the self-regulated firm aims at
reducing future effort and increasing the number of self-regulated firms. As more firms
become self-regulated, the reputation and credibility of the self-regulation increases, and
it legitimizes (Potoski and Prakash, 2005). Our main hypothesis is thus:
Hypothesis: Self-regulated firms pressure their peers to adopt self-regulation.
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The case of the Equator Principles
An example of the theory described in the previous section is observed among collaborative
banks that may self-regulate by adopting the Equator Principles, an industry-wide set of
voluntary guidelines for promoting social and environmental responsibility among banks.
Before explaining the role peer pressure plays in bank self-regulation, we first explain the
Equator Principles and their role in bank lending.
Before 2003, an industry-wide legislation addressing the environmental and social risks
associated with bank lending was non-existent (Esty and Sesia, 2005; Scholtens and Dam,
2007). Consequently, banks were targets of high-profile campaigns from NGO’s and other
organizations for their involvement in projects with large and negative environmental and
social damages. This lack of an industry-wide regulation in combination with these cam-
paigns pressured the banking sector into developing a form of regulation to address such
issues. As a result a set of voluntary guidelines, or self-regulation, called the Equator Prin-
ciples were drafted to promote social and environmental responsibility among banks. On
June 4, 2003 eight banks announced the voluntary adoption of these principles (Scholtens
and Dam, 2007; Esty and Sesia, 2005). The eight banks first adopting the Equator Prin-
ciples were Barclays (United Kingdom), Citigroup (United States), Crèdit Swisse Group
(Switzerland), Crèdit Agricole (France), Rabobank (the Netherlands), Royal Bank of Scot-
land (Scotland), UniCredit Bank (Germany), and Westpac Banking Corporation (Aus-
tralia). By the end of 2010, a total of 50 banks from 35 different countries worldwide had
adopted the Equator Principles.1
The Equator Principles apply to a specific type of bank lending called project finance,
which is a form of long-term financing primarily used for infrastructure and development
projects (Kleimeier and Megginson, 2000). These projects consist of two main phases,
construction and operation (Soge, 2004). The construction phase is prone to technolo-
gical and environmental risks. The operation phase is prone to market and political risks.
As these problems arise during the project, banks become the target of multiple public
campaigns which aggravate as banks are more active in project finance lending. In the
case of the Equator Principles, BankTrack is a support organization responsible for pro-
moting changes in banks’ financing activities such that banks are held accountable toward
1 For a comprehensive list of the banks that have adopted the Equator Principles through 2010, see Ap-
pendix B.
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environmental and societal damages. BankTrack monitors and publishes projects led by
banks with a potentially high and negative impact on the environment, society, or both.
Through these public campaigns, banks experience public pressure to change their lending
behavior. As argued in the theory section, banks may then be more likely to react to such
public pressure by adopting the Equator Principles.
Due to their large scale, project finance loans require large amounts of capital. As a
consequence, project finance loans are often syndicated. Loan syndication refers to the
joint issuance of loans by more than one bank.2 Banks in a loan syndicate are either
lead arrangers or participants. Lead arrangers are the most active banks in the syndicate
because they are responsible for establishing a relationship with the firm, negotiating the
loan terms, guaranteeing an amount for a price range, and monitor the borrower (Sufi,
2007; Gopalan, Nanda, and Yerramilli, 2011).3
By forming a syndicate, banks diversify their loan portfolio, share risk and (monitoring)
skills, and can more easily meet capital constraints (Simons, 1993; Ivashina and Scharfstein,
2010; Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000). In a syndicate with lead arrangers having different
knowledge, experience, expertise, and specializations, lead arrangers can leverage each
other’s skills with the purpose of reducing information asymmetries in the loan arrange-
ment process (Tykvova, 2007; Sufi, 2007; Champagne and Kryzanowski, 2007; Godlewski,
Sanditov, and Burger-Helmchen, 2012; Alexy, Block, Sandner, and TerWal, 2012).
The most important costs associated with loan syndication result from agency problems
causing differences in the effort banks exert when arranging loans, in particular when the
differences in skills and competence levels among syndicate members are substantial (Go-
palan, Nanda, and Yerramilli, 2011; Holmström, 1979, 1982; Panyagometh and Roberts,
2002; Lee and Mullineaux, 2004; Tykvova, 2007). For example, if a member of a syndicate
is much more competent (i.e., has better knowledge, more experience, etc.) than another,
the latter may free ride with the former exerting more effort in the syndication process.
For banks that have adopted the Equator Principles, competence and effort sharing
through syndication are particularly important because of the due diligence the Equator
Principles require. Banks that adopt the Equator Principles follow the International Fin-
ance Corporation (IFC)’s safeguard policies and the World Bank’s Pollution Prevention
2 For a background on loan syndication, see Dennis and Mullineaux (2000).
3 Participants are passive syndicate members whose contribution is limited to funding the loan. See Sufi
(2007) for more information about the tasks that lead arrangers and participants perform during the loan
syndication process.
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program (Scholtens and Dam, 2007). In general, banks categorize projects, conduct social
reviews, and perform due diligence of the projects they are to finance.4 According to
the Equator Principles, projects to be financed are classified into one of three categories:
A, B or C. Category A projects have a "potentially significant adverse social or envir-
onmental impact that is diverse, irreversible or unprecedented" (The Equator Principles
Association, 2015). Category B projects have a potentially limited adverse social or en-
vironmental impact that are site-specific, mostly reversible and can be mitigated. Last,
Category C projects have a minimal or no social or environmental impact (The Equator
Principles Association, 2015).
When a project falls in either category A or B, banks conduct social reviews and
perform due diligence. Social reviews involve affected stakeholders, clients, as well as
independent environmental and social consultants assisting in the project review and as-
sessment. Overall, banks prepare a set of assessment documents, management systems and
plans. First, banks have to identify and address the project’s potential risks and impact
through an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA).5 In addition, audits
regarding human rights, pollution standards, design criteria and/or construction stand-
ards may need to be conducted. As financing may originate in different countries with
different legal systems, countries are classified into Designated or Non-Designated coun-
tries.6 For projects in non-designated countries, the Equator Principles require adherence
to the International Finance Corporation (IFC)’s Performance Standards on Environment
and Social Sustainability and the World Bank Group Environmental, Health and Safety
Guidelines. For projects in designated countries, the Equator Principles requires adher-
ence to the laws, regulations and permits pertaining social and environmental issues of the
host country.
Next, the borrower of the loan also known as the client, prepares an Environmental and
Social Management Plan (ESMP). As part of this plan, the client engages stakeholders
to address and mitigate potential issues identified in the assessment process. In addition,
independent environmental and social consultants participate in the process by assessing
the documentation and systems put together by the banks and the borrower. Finally,
4The Equator Principles Association provides minimum standards to be followed by the banks adopting the
principles and at their discretion, banks may apply additional requirements when financing projects.
5 ESIA documents are partly or fully available online.
6The list of designated and non-designated countries can be found on the Equator Principles Association’s
website.
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banks prepare public reports on their Equator Principles implementation processes and
experiences at least once per year.
In practice, it is common to observe project finance loans being syndicated by a mix
of banks that have adopted the Equator Principles and banks that have not adopted
the Equator Principles. Since adopters of the Equator Principles are committed to the
regulation and non-adopters are not, syndication by banks suggests that adopters exert
more effort when jointly lending with a non-adopter of the Equator Principles because of
the due diligence they are required to conduct. Hence, we conjecture that syndication of
project finance loans by banks that have adopted the Equator Principles and banks that
have not leads to an effort asymmetry between adopters and non-adopters.
As a result, we expect a bank that has adopted the Equator Principles and syndicates
a project finance loan, with a bank that has not adopted the Equator Principles, to
pressure the non-adopter. In this way, the adopter can reduce effort in future syndicate
collaborations while contributing to the legitimization of the principles by increasing the
number of adopters. We refer to this behavior as peer pressure.
In sum, the emergence of the Equator Principles as a form of self-regulation is a response
by banks to public pressures for stricter regulation in bank lending. If adopting the
Equator Principles, banks reduce the information asymmetries regarding their lending
practices in project finance by committing to "[...] implementing the [Equator Principles]
in their internal environmental and social policies, procedures and standards for financing
projects and [...] not provid[ing] [p]roject [f]inance [...] where the client will not, or is
unable to, comply with the [Equator Principles]" (The Equator Principles Association,
2015). Hence, with a mix of banks that have and have not adopted the Equator Principles
working together in loan syndicates, effort asymmetries in the loan syndication process
arise. These effort asymmetries result from the due diligence adopters of the Equator
Principles have to conduct. In an attempt to reduce effort asymmetries, adopters of the
Equator Principles may exert peer pressure on the non-adopting banks. Therefore, the
adoption of the Equator Principles is a clear example of the adoption of self-regulation in
a context where firms collaborate.
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Empirical framework
We have conjectured that self-regulated firms, when collaborating with non-self-regulated
firms, may opt to exert peer pressure on the non-self-regulated firm with the purpose to
reduce any effort asymmetries. In particular, we are interested in the event of a bank
adopting the Equator Principles given that it collaborates with a bank that has adopted
the Equator Principles and possibly exerts pressure on its peer bank with the purpose of
reducing effort asymmetries in their collaboration. There are three conditions we require
from our empirical setup. First, we want to account for banks that have not yet adopted
the principles, but may nevertheless do it later at some unknown time. Second, we want
to recover an estimate of the speed of adoption. Third, we want to account for the devel-
opment in the syndicated lending market as environmental changes into our specification
model.
In order to model the event of a bank adopting the Equator Principles, we therefore
estimate a Cox proportional hazards model, which fulfills all three conditions. Equation
(1) summarizes our empirical setting:
λi(t) = λ0(t)exp[βppPeer Pressureij + βcControls], (1)
where the left-hand side term in Equation (1) is the hazard of banki adopting the Equator
Principles. On the right-hand side of the equation, we find a baseline hazard function, a set
of covariates, and a set of coefficients to be estimated. The first term on the right-hand side,
λ0(t), is the baseline hazard, a time-dependent unspecified term that allows environmental
changes to be treated as an arbitrary function of time. The set of covariates includes Peer
Pressureij , which is our proxy for our main hypothesis, and a group of controls to be
explained in greater detail in the next paragraphs. βpp, and βc are coefficients explaining
the effects of Peer Pressureij , and controls on banki’s likelihood of adopting the Equator
Principles, respectively. Although we exclude all time subscripts for ease of exposition, it
is important to note that our covariates are time-varying, and they are measured for the
same time period, unless otherwise specified.
Our main covariate is called Peer Pressureij . According to our hypothesis, the peer
pressure exerted by bankj steers banki into adopting the Equator Principles. Hence, βpp is
an estimate of the propensity of banki with Peer Pressureij to adopt the Equator Principles,
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and we expect βpp to have an effect greater than one, that is, a positive effect toward the
adoption of the principles. We measure Peer Pressureij as the concentration of bankj ’s
collaborations with banki, given that bankj is an adopter of the Equator Principles. In
the context of our empirical framework, the mechanism underlying peer pressure can be
explained as follows: if bankj is an adopter of the Equator Principles and collaborates
with banki, and the collaboration between bankj and banki intensifies, then the effort
asymmetry between bankj and banki increases. It increases because every time banki
(non-adopter) and bankj (adopter) collaborate, bankj is responsible for conducting all
due diligence required by the Equator Principles Association. That is, bankj exerts more
effort in the loan arrangement process than banki every time they collaborate. Therefore,
in an attempt to reduce these effort asymmetries, bankj is expected to exert peer pressure
on banki into adopting the Equator Principles as well.
Equation (2) below shows how Peer Pressureij is calculated:
Peer Pressureij = ConcentrationijIj , Ij ∈ [0, 1], i 6= j (2)
where Ij is an indicator variable equal to one when bankj is an adopter of the Equator
Principles and equal to zero otherwise. To measure the intensity of the collaboration
between banki and bankj , we define a variable called Concentrationij corresponding to
the ratio between the number of joint loan syndications between banki and bankj to the
total number of syndications bankj has been involved in. Thus, Peer Pressureij is greater
than zero only when banki and bankj collaborate through loan syndications and when
bankj is an adopter of the Equator Principles.
We employ a set of controls to capture various other elements affecting the syndication
process and the likelihood for adopting the Equator Principles. These controls include
Number of Project Finance Loansi, Equator Bankj , Number of Equator Relationshipsi,
Concentrationij , Public Pressuret−1i , and Country ESGi.
Our first control, Number Project Finance Loansi, is the number of project finance
loans arranged by banki. Equator Bankj is an indicator variable that is expected to be
equal to one if peer bankj is an adopter of the Equator Principles and zero otherwise. We
control for a bank’s level of project finance lending because of two main reasons. First, as
banks arrange more project finance loans, the possibility of financing a project going astray
increases. Therefore, adoption of the Equator Principles may serve as a way to prevent or
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correct any damages from public campaigns against the bank. Second, as banks become
responsible for more project finance loans, they become the key players in the market
placing themselves as the focal point of public criticisms in case their lending activities
become the targets of public campaigns. To capture a collective form of peer pressure also
possibly increasing the likelihood of adopting the Equator Principles, we include Number
of Equator Relationships as the number of unique syndicate collaborations banki has with
adopters of the Equator Principles.
In addition, we control for the public pressures banks may experience which may also
increase their adoption of the Equator Principles. Our control variable, Public Pressuret−1i
measures whether a bank has been the target of public campaigns led by BankTrack.
We obtain such information from BankTrack’s website, which reports banks’ financing
activities of projects posing social and/or environmental challenges if implemented and
labels them as "dodgy deals." Public Pressuret−1i is then equal to one if banki is listed as
the financier of a “dodgy deal” at time t-1 and zero otherwise.
Finally, a bank operating in a country with a weaker environmental, social and gov-
ernance transparency may be more inclined to adopt the Equator Principles to complement
the lack of existing regulation. We therefore use Bloomberg’s Environmental, Social and
Governance (ESG) reporting transparency measures for the country in which banki is
headquartered.
Data
The Loan Pricing Corporation’s DealScan database provides us with data on global corpor-
ate loans, which also include data on syndicated loans. DealScan is the main data source for
research in syndicated lending (Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000; Sufi, 2007; Champagne and
Kryzanowski, 2007; Francois and Missonier-Piera, 2007; Gatti, Kleimeier, Megginson, and
Steffanoni, 2013; Godlewski and Weill, 2008; Godlewski, Sanditov, and Burger-Helmchen,
2012; Gopalan, Nanda, and Yerramilli, 2011; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Jones, Land,
and Nigro, 2005). Since the Equator Principles were drafted in 2003, we collect data on
loan originations from 2003 through 2010. The data provided by DealScan allows us to
observe the syndicate structure of these loans. In line with Sufi (2007) we identify lead
arrangers from DealScan’s "Lead Arrangers" field or —if missing —from the banks lis-
ted with a lead role in the "All Lenders" field. Adopters of the Equator Principles are
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identified among these lead arrangers taking their year of adoption into account.7
The adopters of the Equator Principles
In order to understand the differences in lending activities, we compare the banks that
have adopted the Equator Principles to the banks that have not adopted the Equator
Principles. Table 1 compares the key characteristics between adopters and non-adopters
of the Equator Principles. Between 2003 and 2010, the typical bank adopting the Equator
Principles arranges larger loan amounts and more loans. On average, adopters of the
Equator Principles arrange 123.77 loans, and close to one project finance loan on a yearly
basis. Non-adopters only arrange 15.46 loans, with an average of 0.11 project finance
loans, between 2003 and 2010. This suggests that while the number of banks adopting the
Equator Principles is not large, they are the most active banks in the loan market.
An interesting aspect is that project finance loans make up only two percent and one
percent of the lending portfolios for non-adopters and adopters, respectively.8 On the
face of it, adopting the Equator Principles thereby does not appear to be driven by the
materiality of project finance lending for these banks.
Since adopters of the Equator Principles syndicate more loans, we expect them to
collaborate with more banks as well. Indeed, adopters of the Equator Principles collaborate
almost ten times more than non-adopters both with fellow lead arrangers and with any
bank in any particular role, as variables Number of Lender Collaborations and Number of
Arranger Collaborations indicate.
[Insert Table 1 here]
The picture that emerges from Table 1 is similar to the one drawn by Scholtens and
Dam (2007): the number of banks adopting the Equator Principles is small yet the impact
of adoption is large. Additional support for this finding is provided in Table A1 in the
Appendix, which presents yearly project finance league tables for years 2003-2010. These
league tables show the top 10 banks in terms of their lending activity within the project
finance lending market. Adopters of the Equator Principles are marked with an asterisk
(*) in these league tables.
7We focus on lead arrangers as they, rather than the passive participants, need to collaborate and might
thus experience peer and external pressures.
8This is based on the measure Project Finance Concentration calculated as the ratio between the share of
the project finance loans arranged over the share of all loans arranged. Share is calculated as the loan size
divided by the number of lead arrangers in the syndicate.
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By 2008, the number of adopters has not only increased, but adopters occupy the top
positions in the league table.9 With the market share of adopters starting at 47% in 2005,
this market share reaches a peak in 2008 with 64% and by 2010, it equals 68%.
In order to delve into the geographical patterns in the adoption of the Equator Prin-
ciples, we refer to Table 1, which displays the country of origin of the adopters in our
sample. Adopters come from 22 different countries in North America, South America,
Europe, Africa/Middle East, and Asia and Oceania. Most of the adopters are concen-
trated in Europe, and South America has the fewest number of adopters. From Table A2
in the Appendix, we learn that the Netherlands leads in terms of adoption, followed by
Canada, France, the U.S. and U.K.10 Whereas the U.K. has the largest number of early
adopters, French banks are slow in adopting. Although they started fairly late, countries
such as Brazil, Spain and South Africa, each also headquarter a fair number of adopters.
Lead arranger collaboration network characteristics
In order to study the peer pressure effects adopting banks exert on non-adopting banks, we
focus on bank-pair syndication relationships and we study them through an observation
period of eight years. The bank for which we measure adoption is referred to as banki
and the bank that possibly exerts peer pressure is referred to as bankj . Because banki
and bankj may not syndicate loans every year in our observation period, our panel of
observations is unbalanced.
To estimate the survival probabilities of adopting the Equator Principles, only banks
active in syndicating project finance loans, that is, banks jointly arranging at least one
project finance loan between 2003 and 2010, enter the study. We exclude banki if not
active in the project finance loan market as it has no intrinsic need or interest in adopting
the Equator Principles, and we also exclude banks that do not jointly arrange loans with
others as they are not subject to peer pressures. In contrast, we consider all banki-
bankj collaborations, irrespective of whether banki and bankj collaborate through project
9We calculate the market share of adopters as the total project finance loan amount arranged by adopters of
the Equator Principles within the league table divided over the total project finance loan amount arranged
by all banks in the league table.
10 The data reported in this table has been collected from the Equator Principles Association’s website and it
includes information like the country of origin of adopters and year of adoption. Note that the number of
adopters by country may differ between the ones reported in Table A2 and our sample because our sample
includes those banks that are active in project finance and report their lending activities to Loan Pricing
Corporation for publication in their DealScan database. Therefore, we have fewer banks in our sample.
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finance or any other type of syndicated loans. This reflects our belief that bankj exerts
peer pressure onto banki via all forms of syndicated lending. The status variable observed
in our survival estimation indicates whether banki has adopted the Equator Principles.
We censor banki if it has not adopted the Equator Principles.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the covariates used in our survival model.
Among the total of 41,403 bank-pairs that co-arrange loans between 2003 and 2010, the
average banki receives a peer pressure equal to 1%. That is, the average bank that arranges
project finance loans makes up 1% of the portfolio of collaborations of bankj , which has
adopted the Equator Principles. While this average is low, the impact on the adoption of
the Equator Principles is large because 4% of all banki’s receive a peer pressure of 50% or
more. This suggests that bank syndications are diffused throughout the network formed by
the banks in our sample; nevertheless, some of these syndications are highly concentrated.
On average, however, a banki collaborates with slightly more than 20 adopters, as shown
by the variable Number of Equator Relationshipsi in Table 2.
We observe that the level of project finance activity by banks is highly skewed with a
median of four and an average of 12.98 project finance loans, respectively, and with some
banks partaking in a substantial number of project finance loans that can reach up to
124 loans in a given year. On average, 21% of all banks active in project finance arrange
receive public pressure from BankTrack because one or more the projects they finance are
classified as "dodgy" and published on BankTrack’s website. In terms of geographical char-
acteristics, we classify banks by the country in which they are headquartered according to
Bloomberg’s 2010 Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) country classification.11
Higher ESG country scores correspond to countries with better Environmental, Social and
Governance data disclosure as measured in Bloomberg’s Sustainability Survey. While in
theory these scores can reach a maximum value of 100 for countries with a complete data
disclosure, the highest score in our sample is 63.58 and it corresponds to Sweden. On
average, the banks in the study come from a country with an ESG profile of 53.72, a value
close to the one assigned to countries like Mexico or Israel. The lowest score in our sample
is equal to 33.41 and it corresponds to Saudi Arabia.
11 Bloomberg released its country ESG scores in 2009. Since scores are fairly time invariant over the short
time window, we choose to only use ESG scores for year 2010.
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Results
Our main aim is to find out whether peer pressure influences the likelihood of adopting the
Equator Principles, its implications, and to see how robust peer pressure is in the presence
of other types of pressure banks may experience when syndicating loans.
We begin by estimating the effect of peer pressure. Table 3 contains the hazard estim-
ates of banki adopting the Equator Principles in the presence of Peer Pressureij , and a
set of six controls: Number of Project Finance Loansi, Number of Equator Relationships,
Public Pressuret−1i , Country ESGi, Concentrationij , and Equator Bankj .
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[Insert Table 3 here]
First, we estimate our base model, without accounting for a bank’s public pressures or
its country’s ESG profile. The results of our base model are included in column (1) in Table
3. Next, we add the impact of public pressure in column (2), and the role of governance in
banki’s country of origin in column (3). In column (4) we include both variables, Public
Pressuret−1i and Country ESGi. When comparing the effect Peer Pressureij has in the
different specifications, we observe that it is very similar in sign, magnitude, and signific-
ance. The hazard rate for Peer Pressureij is greater than one and statistically significant
implying that peer pressure does result in banki adopting the Equator Principles.
Of all the reported specifications in Table 3, column (4) contains our most complete
model and explains 13.42% of the variation in the hazard of the adoption of the Equator
Principles. We therefore focus our discussion on the results reported in column (4).
Through peer pressure, bankj , an adopter of the Equator Principles, is able to influ-
ence banki into adopting the principles as the hazard ratio of 2.575 reflects. This finding
supports our main hypothesis. In order to assess the relevance peer pressure on the adop-
tion of self-regulation, we calculate the relative risk for varying values of Concentrationij
both when bankj is an Equator Bank and when it is not.13 We find that when banki
12Recall that in our estimates, the time-varying likelihood of adopting the Equator Principles is proportional
to an unspecified baseline hazard function (Cox, 1972). To estimate the hazard model in this manner,
we have to assume that the covariates are proportional to the baseline hazard function. We tested this
assumption in two ways. First, we look at the martingale residuals following Lin, Wei, and Ying (1993).
We fit an observed empirical score process based on martingale residuals. Then, based on 1,000 random
simulation paths, we draw an empirical score process and compare the simulated and observed scores.
Since they are not different from each other, we cannot reject the proportionality assumption. Second, we
use Schoenfeld Residuals, calculated as the difference between the covariate value for observation i and
its expected value, where observation i experiences the event (adopts the Equator Principles). We then
test these residuals for time independence, and we find that since they are indeed independent of time, the
proportionality assumption holds.
13Relative risk is calculated as follows: λ0(t)exp(φβpp)λ0(t)exp(ψβpp) , where φ ∈ R and ψ ∈ R are the values for which the
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collaborates with an Equator Bankj and this collaboration concentration increases by one
standard deviation, or by 0.03, bankj will adopt the Equator Principles at a rate of 8%.
As collaborations become more concentrated and increase by two and three standard devi-
ations, or by 0.06 and 0.09, the likelihood of adopting the Equator Principles is 16.7% and
26.1%, respectively. In other words, as peer pressure increases, the likelihood of adopting
the Equator Principles increases as well.
While banks arranging a large number of project finance loans may be more likely
to adopt the Equator Principles, we do not find any significant effect. And, even with
a statistically significant hazard rate equal to 1.002 in specifications (1) and (3), we can
conclude that the number of project finance loans arranged has a minimal effect in the
adoption of the Equator Principles: for each additional project finance loan banki arranges,
the likelihood of adopting the Equator Principles increases by only 0.20%, all else equal.
For this type of pressure to be meaningful, say resulting in an increase in the likelihood
of adopting the Equator Principles of 5%, banki has to increase the number of project
finance loans it arranges by 20 loans in any given year. This increase is sizable given that
the 75th percentile corresponding to the number of project finance loans banks arrange is
only equal to 15.
The multiple collaborations banki has with other Equator banks, proxied by the vari-
able Number of Equator Relationshipsi, may influence a bank’s tendency to become self-
regulated. According to the results presented in Table 3, these collaborations indeed
increase the likelihood of adopting the Equator Principles, with a hazard ratio of 1.068.
Since the average banki collaborates 20 adopters through multiple other loans, we can
calculate the sensitivity an increase in these collaborations has on adoption.14 For a bank
not collaborating with adopters of the Equator Principles, arranging a loan with a single
adopter increases the likelihood of adoption by 1%. This relative hazard increases to 6%,
9%, and 12% as the number of equator relationships increases to two, three and four,
respectively. However, the relative hazard plateaus once the change in the number of col-
laborations is greater than four, demonstrating that there are decreasing returns to scale
to this type of pressure.
Banks being targets of public campaigns experience a public pressure influencing their
adoption of the Equator Principles. In fact, banks encountering public pressures from
relative risk is to be calculated.
14 From Table 2, we observe that the number of Equator relationships ranges from 0 to 49.
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BankTrack have a 34.1% higher likelihood of subsequently adopting the Equator Principles
as opposed to banks not receiving such public pressures. It appears that the adoption of
the Equator Principles as a form of damage control is a rather popular strategy by banks.
Interestingly, banks headquartered in countries with (other) strict ESG rules are less
likely to adopt the Equator Principles, although to a lower extent. For example, all else
equal, a bank headquartered in Sweden (with the maximum ESG score of 63.58) is 2.5%
less likely to adopt the Equator Principles than a bank headquartered in Mexico (with
an ESG score close to the sample average and equal to 54.09). Even when we compare a
Swedish bank to a bank headquartered in Saudi Arabia (with the minimum ESG score of
33.41), the difference in the likelihood of adoption is a mere 7.6%.
In sum, we find that adoption rates increase with the relative intensity that a non-
adopter collaborates with an adopter (peer pressure), the absolute intensity that a non-
adopter collaborates with an adopter (Collaborationsij), and the number of different ad-
opters that a non-adopter collaborates with. We conclude that self-regulation will spread
more quickly and become the standard in an industry that is more interconnected. For
policy makers this suggests that self-regulation is a good strategy for highly-connected
industries, whereas, explicit or mandatory regulation may be a better choice for industries
in which firms collaborate less closely and intensely.
Since we are assessing the impact of peer pressure on adopting self-regulation, it is of
particular interest to study the effects of the accumulation of pressure. In order to do
so, we use our survival analysis model to dig deeper into the time patterns of adoption.
Figure 2 presents the survivor function for banki adopting the Equator Principles when
all covariates are equal to the average. The x-axis in this figure is the observation period.
Since the survival model that we estimated considers adoption of the Equator Principles as
the event of interest, survival in this context implies no adoption of the Equator Principles.
Therefore, a survivorship close to one indicates no adoption and lower survivorship rates
indicate adoption.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
The survivor function in Figure 2 illustrates how pressure builds up: we can see that
survival rates decrease (adoption of the Equator Principles increases) as the observation
period increases. For example, we see that in the first two periods (years) of observation,
adoption does not occur. However, adoption then increases to 40% after the third time
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period, and ends with a 92.5% adoption likelihood by the end of the eight observation time
periods. This means that for a banki whose covariates are equal to the average, likelihood
of adopting the Equator Principles increases from zero to 92.5% after eight years. In
other words, banki adopts the Equator Principles with a rate of 92.5% after eight years of
receiving peer pressure of 1%, social pressure of 12.98, collective peer pressures of 19.59,
while collaborating with an adopter of the Equator Principles 23% of the time. In reality,
it is rare that a bank is the subject of all types of pressure at the same time, which explains
why actual adoption rates are much lower.
Robustness
The extent to which firms feel pressured into adopting self-regulation may be different in
extreme situations, encountered by only very few firms. In order to find out whether such
extreme situations drive our results, we now delve into three of those extreme situations
for banki. First, we focus on banks extremely active in project finance. Next, we focus on
banks operating in regions where the Equator Principles are extremely popular. Finally,
we focus on banks experiencing extreme peer pressure.
Activity levels in project finance arrangement
In the syndicated loan market for project finance, not all banks are equal. As evidenced
by the existence of league tables such as in Table A1, some banks are particularly active,
acting as the spiders in the syndicated lending web. Consequently, to find out whether
these active banks drive our results, we repeat our analysis, but this time we explicitly
account for whether banks are very active, or less active in project financing.
In order to conduct this complementary analysis, we include three additional (dummy)
variables. Number of Project Finance Loansi ≤3 indicates when a bank is in the lowest
quartile of arranging activity in the market. Banks in the most active quartile are indicated
with the variable Number of Project Finance Loansi ≥18, and the second most active
quartile is indicated by Number of Project Finance Loansi >6 and <18. The control
group in our analysis is the second quartile, which is closest to the average. In order to
fully understand the effects of project financing and peer pressure on the adoption of the
Equator Principles, we interact our new indicators with our covariates Concentrationij
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and Equator Bankj .
[Insert Table 4 here]
We find that Peer Pressureij , remains robust throughout all four specifications reported
in Table 4. As is to be expected, the impact of Number of Project Finance Loansi is now
significantly less than one suggesting that as banks arrange more project finance loans, the
tendency to adopt the Equator Principles decreases. However, the effect is rather small at
0.3%.
The main lesson learned from the results presented in Table 4 comes from what happens
to those banks that are most and least active in project finance, respectively. We observe
the likelihood of adoption in both groups being lower than for the benchmark average
group. However, in order to accurately compare both groups, we need to take all cross
terms into account. Doing so allows us to find that banks arranging less than three project
finance loans have a 74% higher likelihood of adopting the Equator Principles than a bank
arranging between six and 17 project finance loans.15 This suggests that the least active
banks in the market are in fact more sensitive to peer pressure effects than the more active
and established banks.
Countries with a large numbers of banks adopting the Equator Prin-
ciples
The cumulative impact of peer pressure may not just manifest itself through repeated
interactions with an adopter of the Equator Principles, but also in the aggregate. In
order to find out how peer pressure fares in countries where the adoption of the Equator
Principles is particularly common, we select a sub-sample of banks operating in those
countries. We refer to Table A2 in the Appendix, and select Canada (seven adopters),
The Netherlands (six adopters), Australia, Brazil, France, the U.K. and the U.S. (four
adopters each), and Japan and South Africa (three adopters each). Table 5 presents the
results.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Indeed, the impact of peer pressure is higher for this sample. Our independent vari-
able, Peer Pressureij , remains robust throughout all specifications. The likelihood of peer
pressure in adopting the Equator Principles, given that there is a collaboration with an
15 For regression 4, the relative risk is calculated as follows: λ0(t)exp[log2.72(9.193)×1×Concentrationij+log2.72(0.548)×1]λ0(t)exp[log2.72(22.451)×1×Concentrationij+log2.72(0.301)×1]
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adopter of the Equator Principles is 62.5% higher than in the absence of such a collabor-
ation.16 Meanwhile, the effect of all other variables remain robust with the exception of
the Number of Project Finance Loansi, which now has a hazard rate less than one but its
effect is marginally small.
Extreme peer pressure
Our final robustness test concerns the impact of extreme peer pressure on the likelihood
of adopting the Equator Principles. In order to study this, we have to re-assemble our
dataset. In our analysis so far, we have studied pairings between banks over time. Now,
we wish to measure extreme peer pressure, i.e. the maximum amount of pressure a bank
receives in a given year from all the banks with whom it collaborates.
We thereby redefine our measure for peer pressure as follows:17
Peer Pressurei = max
j
[Peer Pressureij ] = max
j
[
ConcentrationijIj
]
, Ij ∈ [0, 1], (3)
where Peer Pressurei now corresponds to the maximum peer pressure banki receives from
all its collaborations with adopters of the Equator Principles. Certainly, when banki col-
laborates with just one adopter, then Peer Pressurei is equal to the peer pressure the one
adopter exerts. When banki does not collaborate with any adopters, then Peer Pressurei
is equal to zero. In order to be consistent, we also redefine Equator Bankj as an indicator
variable equal to one if banki has any collaborations with adopters of the Equator Prin-
ciples, and zero otherwise. We now define Concentrationij as the maximum concentration
that banki has with any bankj . We use the same covariate definitions for Number of Pro-
ject Finance Loansi, Number of Equator Relationshipsi, Public Pressuret−1i , and Country
ESGi as these covariates pertain to banki only.
[Insert Table 6 here]
From Table 6, we learn that the impact of peer pressure almost doubles when we focus
on extreme peer pressure. The Number of Project Finance Loansi is no longer significant.
Public pressure no longer plays a role in the adoption of the Equator Principles when peer
pressure is at its maximum. Being headquartered in a country with a good ESG profile
16 exp[log2.72(1.819)× 1− log2.72(0.093)× 1]=0.5985-0.1132=1.6250.
17 Interestingly, although it may appear to pay a price for redefining peer pressure, a lower number of obser-
vations, we now are less susceptible of overestimating our standard errors.
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gains importance, but in this —more aggregate—analysis it appears to cover some of the
other sources of pressure, such as that coming from collaborations with Equator banks
which loses statistical significance when controlling for Country ESGi.
Discussion
The analysis presented in this study responds to an unexplored issue in the extant lit-
erature: the adoption of self-regulation by firms interacting through collaborations. Our
findings support the idea that collaborating firms, and in our case collaborating banks,
exert pressure on each other to reduce effort asymmetries by adopting self-regulation.
In order to explore the effect of the peer pressure mechanisms self-regulated firms exert
on their non-self-regulated peers, we focus on the syndicated loan market in which banks
may opt for self-regulation by adopting the Equator Principles and in which banks tend
to collaborate by jointly syndicating loans. We find that as banks collaborate, pressure
from adopters increases the likelihood of adopting the Equator Principles, as firms pressure
their peers into becoming self-regulated.
We conjecture that the incentives for firms to pressure their peers into becoming self-
regulated lies in the effort asymmetry that arises from the collaboration between self-
regulated and non-self-regulated firms. We show that banks adopting the Equator Prin-
ciples are tasked with extensive due diligence also requiring the involvement of the bor-
rowing firm and external auditors. When a bank that has adopted the Equator Principles
collaborates with a bank that has not adopted the principles, all the due diligence required
by the Equator Principles Association is to be carried out by the adopter alone, i.e. the
adopter is required to exert more effort. Hence, in an attempt to reduce such effort dif-
ferences, the adopter exerts pressure on its peer bank such that the bank with whom it
collaborates adopts the Equator Principles as well, and the effort asymmetry is reduced
in future collaborations.
While in this research, we focus on the adoption of self-regulation, it should be clear that
the results presented here apply to many other areas in which collaborations between firms
are observed, including for example the adoption of technology, products, and strategic
decision making.
However, how generalizable our results are depends among others on the specifics of
both self-regulation and collaboration, respectively. First, it is important to study the
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benefits associated with the adoption of the of the Equator Principles and self-regulation
in general. What is the shadow price of adopting the Equator Principles? Is adoption of
the Equator Principles associated with the financial performance of the adopting bank?
Are banks more inclined to adopt the Equator Principles as a way to correct their public
image after being damaged and hurting their financial performance? Or are the better-
performing banks adopting the Equator Principles? A partial answer to these questions
come from an analysis of the reaction of stock prices following the public announcement of
banks adopting the Equator Principles. Scholtens and Dam (2007) conduct a similar study
and find no effect on the stock returns following the adoption of the Equator Principles
and argue this might be due to the small portion that project financing represents within
a bank’s loan portfolio.
All things considered, in this paper we studied self-regulation in a market in which
firms collaborate. In particular, we studied self-regulation by banks in the syndicated loan
market as they adopt the Equator Principles. We found that as banks adopt the Equator
Principles, they exert peer pressure on their collaborating partners to adopt the principles
as well, the reason being to reduce the effort asymmetries that arise from the collaboration
between a self-regulated and a non-self-regulated firm. The approach that we propose here
can be widely extended and adapted to explore other units of analysis and other types of
adoptions besides self-regulation.
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B Appendix: Adopters of the Equator Principles
Table A2: Adopters of the Equator Principles
Year Bank Name Country
2003 Westpac Banking Corporation Australia
Barclays United Kingdom
Citigroup United States
Crèdit Suisse Group Switzerland
Crèdit Agricole France
Rabobank The Netherlands
Royal Bank of Scotland Scotland
UniCredit Bank Germany
ING Bank The Netherlands
Royal Bank of Canada Canada
HSBC United Kingdom
Standard Chartered United Kingdom
Mizuho Bank Japan
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Canada
2004 KBC Group Belgium
Eksport Kredit Fonden Denmark
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Spain
Itaù Unibanco Brazil
Banco Bradesco Brazil
Manulife Financial Canada
2005 Wells Fargo Bank United States
Banco Espìrito Santo Portugal
Bank of Montreal Canada
FMO The Netherlands
Nedbank South Africa
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Japan
2006 Banco do Brasil Brazil
Bank of America United States
Intesa Sanpaolo Italy
Bank of Nova Scotia Canada
JP Morgan United States
ANZ Australia
Table Continues in Next Page
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Table Continued
Year Bank Name Country
2007 Nordea Bank Sweden
Banco de Galicia y Buenos Aires Argentina
CaixaBank Spain
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken Sweden
CIFI Costa Rica
TD Bank Financial Group Canada
Corpbanca Chile
Bank Muscat Sultanate of Oman
Sociètè Gènèrale France
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation Japan
National Australia Bank Australia
Export Development Canada Canada
2008 Banco de la República Oriental de Uruguay Uruguay
Lloyds Banking Group United Kingdom
KfW IPEX-Bank Germany
DNB Norway
BNP Paribas France
Industrial Bank China
Bancolombia Colombia
2009 Arab African International Bank Egypt
Standard Bank South Africa
Efic Australia
Banco Santander Spain
Access Bank Plc Nigeria
FirstRand Africa
ABN Amro The Netherlands
ASN Bank The Netherlands
CAIXA Econˆomica Federal Brazil
2010 BMCE Bank Morocco
NIBC Bank The Netherlands
Natixis France
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Figure 1: A framework for the adoption of codes of conduct
Figure 2: Survivor function
The survivor function plotted in this figure, S(t) = P{T > t}, represents the survivorship of
banki whose covariate values are equal to the average. The average estimation of this survival
function indicates that after 8 years of arranging project finance loans, 92.5% of the banks in
our sample adopt the Equator Principles (survival rate= 7.5%)
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Table 1: Loan characteristics of banks that adopt and do not adopt the Equator
Principles
This table presents the lending characteristics of the banks in our sample that have not adopted
the Equator Principles (Panel A) and the lending characteristics of the banks in our sample that
have adopted the Equator Principles (Panel B). Loan amounts are presented in million U.S.
dollars and they correspond to the share of the loan arranged by banks calculated as the ratio
between loan size and the number of arrangers in a given year. Observation period: 2003-2010
Mean Min 25%ile Median 75%ile Max Std.Dev.
Panel A: Sub-sample of banks that have not adopted the Equator Principles
Loan Amount (USD MM) 1,662.21 0.00 46.95 159.27 749.03 190,858.13 7,559.19
Project Finance Amount (USD MM) 14.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4,206.42 121.89
Number of Project Finance Loans 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.00 0.50
Number of Loans 15.46 1.00 1.00 2.00 10.00 1007.00 47.79
Project Finance Concentration 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.01
Number of Lender Collaborations 141.14 1.00 6.00 19.00 89.00 9,712.00 487.46
Number of Arranger Collaborations 72.43 1.00 3.00 12.00 49.00 3,203 211.47
Nbank−year = 60,327
Panel B: Sub-sample of banks that have adopted the Equator Principles
Loan Amount (USD MM) 15,994.58 2.85 216.16 2,341.99 15,406.93 503,362.95 39,147.57
Project Finance Amount (USD MM) 93.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 34.93 4264.01 309.47
Number of Project Finance Loans 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 15.00 1.99
Number of Loans 123.77 1.00 2.00 23.00 152.00 913.00 191.86
Project Finance Concentration 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.04
Number of Lender Collaborations 1,095.25 1.00 2.00 23.00 1,586.00 9,382.00 1,698.75
Number of Arranger Collaborations 572.30 1.00 12.00 107.00 787.00 4,320.00 867.23
Number of adopters in North America 8
Number of adopters in South America 4
Number of adopters in Europe 26
Number of adopters in Africa/Middle East 5
Number of adopters in Asia and Oceania 7
Nbank−year = 41,835
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Summary statistics for the set of explanatory variables for a total of 41,403 bankij pair-year
observations from 2003 through 2010, where banki is active in project finance lending. Summary
statistics are calculated at the banki level. Banksi that do not collaborate in arranging loans
are excluded from this sample.
Covariate N Mean Min 25%ile Median 75%ile Max Std.Dev.
Peer Pressureij 41,403 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.03
Controls:
Number Project Finance Loansi 41,403 12.98 0.00 0.00 4.00 15.00 124.00 20.62
Equator Bankj 41,403 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.42
Number Equator Relationshipsi 41,403 19.59 0.00 11.00 18.00 28.00 49.00 11.37
Concentrationij 41,403 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.06 1.00 0.11
Public Pressuret−1i 38,316 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.41
Country ESGi 36,006 53.72 33.41 50.17 54.46 58.8 63.58 6.27
32
Table 3: Estimations
This table presents the hazard estimates from our Cox Proportional Hazards regression.
Clustered standard errors by bank pair and reported in brackets. Unbalanced panel. Gen-
eralized R-sq calculated as follows: R2 = 1 − exp(−G2/n), where G2 is the likelihood ratio
chi-square statistic for testing the null hypothesis that all covariates have coefficient estimates
equal to 0, and n is the number of observations.
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4)
Peer Pressureij 2.629∗∗∗ 2.673∗∗∗ 2.503∗∗∗ 2.575∗∗∗
[0.2474] [0.2548] [0.2708] [0.2748]
Controls:
Number Project Finance Loansi 1.002∗∗∗ 1.000 1.002∗∗∗ 1.000
[0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004]
Equator Bankj 0.929∗∗∗ 0.936∗∗∗ 0.947∗ 0.951∗
[0.0259] [0.0251] [0.0293] [0.0286]
Number Equator Relationshipsi 1.075∗∗∗ 1.068∗∗∗ 1.071∗∗∗ 1.068∗∗∗
[0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0018] [0.0018]
Concentrationij 1.541∗∗∗ 1.510∗∗∗ 1.596∗∗∗ 1.591∗∗∗
[0.0527] [0.0533] [0.0575] [0.0571]
Public Pressuret−1i 1.606∗∗∗ 1.341∗∗∗
[0.0136] [0.0147]
Country ESGi 0.993∗∗∗ 0.994∗∗∗
[0.0023] [0.0022]
Generalized R-sq 0.1470 0.1688 0.1205 0.1342
N 41,403 38,316 36,006 33,307
Standard errors in brackets
∗ (p<0.10), ∗∗ (p<0.05), ∗∗∗ (p<0.01)
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Table 5: Robustness estimations—countries with high adoption rates
This table presents the hazard estimates from our Cox Proportional Hazards regression.
Clustered standard errors by bank pair. Unbalanced panel. Generalized R-sq calculated as
follows: R2 = 1− exp(−G2/n), where G2 is the likelihood ratio chi-square statistic for testing
the null hypothesis that all covariates have coefficient estimates equal to 0, and n is the number
of observations.
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4)
Peer Pressureij 1.682∗∗∗ 1.820∗∗∗ 1.679∗∗∗ 1.819∗∗∗
[0.2153] [0.2215] [0.2149] [0.2215]
Controls:
Number of Project Finance Loansi 0.996∗∗∗ 0.994∗∗∗ 0.996∗∗∗ 0.994∗∗∗
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002]
Equator Bankj 0.893∗∗∗ 0.893∗∗∗ 0.894∗∗∗ 0.893∗∗∗
[0.0287] [0.0275] [0.0288] [0.0275]
Number of Equator Relationshipsi 1.071∗∗∗ 1.068∗∗∗ 1.072∗∗∗ 1.068∗∗∗
[0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0016]
Concentrationij 1.250∗∗∗ 1.221∗∗∗ 1.255∗∗∗ 1.222∗∗∗
[0.0497] [0.0487] [0.0499] [0.0488]
Public Pressuret−1i 1.457∗∗∗ 1.456∗∗∗
[0.0145] [0.0142]
Country ESGi 0.992∗∗ 0.999
[0.0036] [0.0029]
Generalized R-sq 0.1217 0.1455 0.1220 0.1455
N 17,648 16,170 17,648 16,170
Standard errors in brackets
∗ (p<0.10), ∗∗ (p<0.05), ∗∗∗ (p<0.01)
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Table 6: Robustness estimations—extreme peer pressure
This table presents the hazard estimates from our Cox Proportional Hazards regression.
Clustered standard errors by bank pair. Unbalanced panel. Generalized R-sq calculated as
follows: R2 = 1− exp(−G2/n), where G2 is the likelihood ratio chi-square statistic for testing
the null hypothesis that all covariates have coefficient estimates equal to 0, and n is the number
of observations.
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4)
Peer Pressureij 4.709∗∗∗ 5.066∗∗∗ 4.988∗∗∗ 5.418∗∗∗
[0.4876] [0.4818] [0.4939] [0.4885]
Controls:
Number of Project Finance Loansi 0.994 0.993 0.998 0.998
[0.0041] [0.0042] [0.0047] [0.0048]
Equator Bankj 0.699∗∗ 0.723 0.694 0.722
[0.2164] [0.2187] [0.2370] [0.2322]
Number of Equator Relationshipsi 1.052∗∗∗ 1.048∗∗∗ 1.026∗ 1.025∗
[0.0127] [0.0126] [0.0145] [0.0143]
Concentrationij 1.782∗∗ 1.704∗∗ 1.627∗ 1.58∗
[0.2757] [0.2540] [0.3001] [0.2721]
Public Pressuret−1i 1.499∗∗ 1.271
[0.1767] [0.2152]
Country ESGi 1.057∗∗∗ 1.057∗∗∗
[0.0234] [0.0231]
Generalized R-sq 0.1690 0.1856 0.1576 0.1726
N 926 833 823 738
Standard errors in brackets
∗ (p<0.10), ∗∗ (p<0.05), ∗∗∗ (p<0.01)
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